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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a popular authorization model used to manage data-access
constraints in a wide range of systems. RBAC usually defines the static view on the access rights.
However, to ensure dependability of a system, it is often necessary to model and verify state-
dependent access rights. Such a modelling allows us to explicitly define the dependencies between
the system states and permissions to access and modify certain data. In this paper, we present a
work-in-progress on combining graphical and formal modelling to specify and verify dynamic ac-
cess control. The approach is illustrated by a case study – a reporting management system.
1 Introduction
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a de-facto standard mechanism for specifying the data access
policies in a large variety of computer-based systems [6]. A role represents a job function in the context
of an organization and has associated authorities. The RBAC policy of a system specifies the authorities
granted to each role. Usually RBAC gives a static view on the access rights associated with each role, i.e.,
it defines the permissions to manipulate certain data without referring to the system state. However, such
a static view is often insufficient for ensuring system dependability because it might undermine dynamic
data integrity properties. In this paper, we present a work-in-progress aiming at combining graphical and
formal modelling to represent the dynamic access policy.
A graphical representation is often used as a front-end of a formal model [23, 24, 29, 30]. It facilitates
a transition from an informal, natural language, requirements description to their formal representation.
In our approach, graphical modelling is used to represent the system functions and business logic as-
sociated with them. We rely on the use case model to represent the system roles and functions. The
activity diagram shows the workflow associated with the defined functions. From the graphical represen-
tation we make a transition to a formal model. We use Event-B [2] as our formal modelling framework.
Event-B is a state-based modelling notation. It supports a top-down development approach to correct-
by-construction system development. The system development consists of a sequence of correctness-
preserving model transformations – refinements. Correctness of models and refinements can be verified
by proofs. Rodin platform [22] automates modelling and verification in Event-B.
While creating Event-B specifications, we consult the graphical models to define the roles and the
corresponding functions. The dynamic access rights are modelled as enabling or disabling certain opera-
tions on data, which depend on the system state. Formal modelling allows us to ensure that the dynamic
access rights are preserved throughout the system workflow.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we define the main concepts of dynamic access
policy and present our case study – reporting management system. We define the corresponding graphical
models modelling roles, use cases and the workflow. In Section 3, we give a brief introduction into Event-
B. In Section 4, we present the formal models that have been constructed on the basis of the graphical
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models. We discuss how to represent the dynamic access rights in Event-B. Finally, in Section 5, we
overview the related work and discuss the proposed approach.
2 Towards Reasoning About Dynamic Access Policy
In this section, we will define the main notions and primitives required to reason about behaviour of a
system using the dynamic access control model. We will discuss the notions of users and their roles,
data and the rights to manipulate data. We will also introduce some functions and relations to define the
required inter-relationships between these notions.
Let USERS = {u1,u2, ...,un} be a set of users. The users are core elements of the system. In general,
a user may stand for a person in the organisation, an administrative entity or a non-person entity, such as
a computing (sub)system. We use the term user to cover all the cases.
Let ROLES = {r1,r2, ...,rk} be a set of possible user roles within the system. A role is usually seen
as a job function performed by a user within an organisation. For example, in a security model, a role is
used to indicate the job-related access rights to the data.
Let RIGHT S = {ri1,ri2, ...,rim} be a set of basic access rights that can be defined over the data, e.g.,
create, read, write rights. Moreover, DATA = {d1,d2, ...,dl} denotes a set of data entities. The users
can access data only by executing operations on a data entity that are regulated by corresponding basic
rights. Operations and data are predefined by the underlying system for which RBAC is specified.
The users can access data based on the set of assigned roles. A user authorisation list can be defined
as the mapping between users and roles:
UR Rel : USERS→ P(ROLES),
which assigns a set of user roles to a given user. The notation P(ROLES) stands for the powerset (set of
all subsets) type over elements of the type ROLES.
To formally define access rights to the data provided by the system to different user roles, we define
a function RR Rel that maps each user role to a set of the allowed rights:
RR Rel : ROLES→ P(RIGHT S).
The above definition describes what a user with a specific role is allowed to do with data in general.
However, it does not take into account the system workflow, i.e., it abstracts away from the fact that the
access rights over a data entity for each role also depend on the system state. To demonstrate how this
issue can be addressed via formal modelling and verification in Event-B, let us now consider an example
of a system with a dynamic access control. Then we will show how we can create a specification of such
a system and prove the correctness of its behaviour.
A Case Study – Reporting Management System. To illustrate modelling opportunities of Event-B
with combination of UML, we use a simple case study – a reporting management system.
The Reporting Management System (RMS) is used by different kinds of employees in an organisation
to send periodic (e.g., monthly) work reports. The system has the following requirements:
• The system has three roles – reporter, controller and administrator;
– Every reporter is associated with (supervised by) some controller;
– Every controller can have more than one associated reporter;
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– Every controller is associated with (supervised by) one administrator;
– Every administrator can have more than one associated controller.
• Functionality associated with the roles:
– A reporter can create a new report, modify an existing report or delete a not-approved report,
as well as submit a report to its associated controller;
– A controller can read submitted report received from one of the associated reporters, and can
either approve or disapprove it;
– An administrator has an access to all the reports of all her/his associated controllers, and it is
her/his responsibility to register reports approved by the controllers.
• Report access policies:
– Until a report is submitted, the reporter can modify or delete it.
– As soon as a report is submitted, it cannot be altered or deleted by the reporter any longer.
– Upon controller’s approval, the report is registered by the administrator.
– In case of disapproval, the report is returned back to the reporter and can be further modified
or deleted.
The use case diagram of RMS is presented in Figure 1. It shows the actors, their roles in the sys-
tem and also their possible interactions with the system. The activity diagram for RMS’s workflow is
presented in Figure 2.
Let us note that each actor function requires certain basic access rights. For instance, a reporter, to
be able to execute Modify function, should have read and write access rights to the report file. In its turn,
a reporter’s supervisor – controller – should have read and write access rights to the same file to execute
Approval operation. However, as soon as a reporter submit a report to a controller, she/he can have only
read access right to the report file.
In Section 4, we will present a refinement-based development of RMS. We will discuss how to
represent dynamic access rights in Event-B, formally specify all actors’ operations over the data and
prove the correctness of behaviour of RMS. Before that, we will briefly overview Event-B modelling
framework and its refinement approach.
Create 
report
Modify 
report
Submit 
report
Delete 
report
Approve 
report
Return
report
Register 
report
Reporter
Controller
Administrator
Reporting management system
Figure 1: Use Case Diagram – Reporting Management System
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Figure 2: Activity Diagram – Reporting Management System
3 Modelling and Refinement in Event-B
Event-B [2] is a state-based framework that promotes the correct-by-construction approach to system
development and formal verification by theorem proving. In Event-B, a system model is specified using
the notion of an abstract state machine [2]. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state,
represented as a collection of variables, and defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes the dynamic
behaviour of a modelled system. A machine also has an accompanying component, called context, which
includes user-defined sets, constants and their properties given as model axioms.
Machine M
Variables v
Invariants I
Events
Initialisation
evt1
· · ·
evtN
−→
Context C
Carrier Sets d
Constants c
Axioms A
Figure 3: Event-B machine and context
A general form for Event-B models is given in Figure 3. The machine is uniquely identified by its
name M. The state variables, v, are declared in the Variables clause and initialised in the Initialisation
event. The variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates I given in the Invariants clause.
The invariant clause might also contain other predicates defining essential properties (e.g., safety invari-
ants) that should be preserved during system execution.
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The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of atomic events. In general, an event has
the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, the guard Ge is a predicate over the local
variables of the event and the state variables of the system. The body of an event is defined by a multiple
(possibly nondeterministic) assignment over the system variables. In Event-B, an assignment represents
a corresponding next-state relation Re. Later on, using the concrete syntax in our Event-B models, we
will rely on two kinds of assignment statements: deterministic ones, expressed in the standard form
x := E(x,y), and non-deterministic ones, represented as x :| some condition(x,y,x′). In the latter case,
the state variable x gets non-deterministically updated by the value x′, which may depend on the initial
values of the variables x and y.
The guard defines the conditions under which the event is enabled, i.e., its body can be executed. If
several events are enabled at the same time, any of them can be chosen for execution nondeterministically.
If an event does not have local variables, it can be described simply as:
e =̂ when Ge then Re end.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system development. Development typ-
ically starts from an abstract specification that nondeterministically models the most essential functional
requirements. In a sequence of refinement steps, we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce
detailed design decisions. In particular, we can add new events, split events as well as replace abstract
variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data refinement.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of well-formedness and invariant preservation
as well as correctness of refinement steps, is demonstrated by discharging a number of verification con-
ditions – proof obligations. For instance, to verify invariant preservation, we should prove the following
logical formula:
A(d,c), I(d,c,v), Ge(d,c,x,v), Re(d,c,x,v,v′) ` I(d,c,v′), (INV)
where A are the model axioms, I are the model invariants, d and c are the model constants and sets
respectively, x are the event’s local variables and v,v′ are the variable values before and after event
execution. The full definitions of all the proof obligations are given in [2].
The Rodin platform [22] provides an automated support for formal modelling and verification in
Event-B. In particular, it automatically generates the required proof obligations and attempts to discharge
them. The remaining unproven conditions can be dealt with by using the provided interactive provers.
4 Formal Development of the Reporting Management System in Event-B
In this section, we will present a refinement-based development of the reporting management system
discussed in Section 2. We will model all actors’ functions as Event-B events. In general, the semantics
of each Event-B event is unambiguously defined by a binary relation between all possible pre- and post-
states of the event. Therefore, modelling RMS in Event-B would allow us to define pre- and post-states
for every operation with the data, and model the overall system behaviour as a state transition system.
Moreover, our development will incorporate the essential concepts and relationships between system
elements described in Section 2. We will separately discuss both static and dynamic system aspects,
represented by Event-B contexts and machines respectively.
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Reporting Management System: Abstract Model. Let us note that each actor’s function changes the
state of a certain report. Hence, the overall behaviour of the system, for each particular report, can be
considered as a set of transitions between all the possible states of the report. The corresponding state
diagram is represented in Figure 4.
VOID
CREATED
SUBMITTED
APPROVED
Create	report
Submit	report
Approve	report
Return	report ARCHIVED
Register	report
Delete	report
Modify	report
Figure 4: State diagram – Reporting Management System
In our initial Event-B specification, we abstractly specify changing of states of reports in our system.
We model the set of reports in the system as a function report state. Initially each report has the state
VOID. The actual report creation is modelled by the event CreateReport that changes the state of a
single report rp to CREAT ED, i.e., report state(rp) := CREAT ED. Then the events ModifyReport,
DeleteReport and SubmitReport become enabled. When the report is submitted, its state changes to
SUBMIT T ED. Upon report approval, its state is changed to APPROV ED, otherwise, if the report is
rejected, it returns back to the state CREAT ED. Finally, once the administrator registers already approved
report, the report goes to its final state ARCHIV ED.
The structure of our initial model – machineRMS abs – is given in Figure 5. This machine essentially
covers all the use cases presented in Figure 1. All required sets and constants are defined in the static
part of the model – context RMS c0 (not presented in the paper).
First Refinement: Introducing Roles. The purpose of this refinement step is to elaborate on the
initial system specification and introduce user roles. We will link each role with the set of functions that
correspond to it. Moreover, for each role, we will define the required basic access rights – create, read,
write, delete.
In the context part of Event-B specification, we define a set of actor roles ROLES = {Reporter,
Controller, Administrator}. RIGHTS is the set of basic access rights, where RIGHTS = {C, R, W, D}.
To specify dynamic access rights for the introduced roles, we define a variable permissions with the
following properties:
permissions ∈ ROLES×REPORT S→P(RIGHTS),
∀r ∈ REPORT S · permissions(Reporter,r)⊆ {C,W,R,D}∧
permissions(Controller,r)⊆ {R,W}∧ permissions(Administrator,r)⊆ {R,W}.
The variable permissions is a function that assigns to each role and a report a number of possible access
rights that can be associated with the role.
Obviously, for each role, the set of available access rights to a report depends on the current state
of this report. For instance, a controller can have read (R) and write (W) rights only to the submitted
reports. Moreover, if the report that has been submitted for approval, it cannot be further modified by the
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Machine RMS m0
Sees RMS c0
Variables reports,report state
Invariants
reports⊆ REPORT S ∧
report state ∈ REPORT S→REPORT STATES ∧
report state[reports]⊆ REPORT STATES\{VOID}...
Events
Initialisation =̂ ...
CreateReport =̂
any rp
where rp ∈ DATA
report state(rp) = VOID
then
reports := reports∪ {rp}
report state(rp) := CREATED
end
ModifyReport =̂
any rp
where rp ∈ reports
report state(rp) := CREATED
then
skip
end
DeleteReport =̂ ...
any rp
where rp ∈ reports
report state(rp) = CREATED
then
report state(rp) := VOID
reports := reports\{rp}
end
SubmitReport =̂
any rp
where rp ∈ data
report state(rp) = CREATED
then
report state(rp) := SUBMITTED
end
ApproveReport =̂
any rp
where rp ∈ reports
report state(rp) = SUBMITTED
then
report state(rp) := APPROVED
end
ReturnReport =̂ ...
RegisterReport =̂
any rp
where rp ∈ reports
report state(rp) = APPROVED
then
report state(rp) := ARCHIVED
end
end
Figure 5: The machine RMS abs
reporter until the end of the approval period. Therefore, during the approval period, the reporter has only
read (R) right to this particular report. Hence, we should restrict the set of enabled rights depending on a
report’s state. To address this new behaviour, we refine the corresponding events of the abstract model.
Some of the refined CreateReport and SubmitReport events are presented in Figure 6.
The model invariants describe the dynamic access policies depending on a report state. These in-
variants ensure access rights conformity to avoid possible conflicts between the roles. Thereby, it allows
us to prove the dynamic data integrity properties within the model. Some invariants are presented in
Figure 6.
Further Refinements. In the subsequent refinement steps, we augment the specification with further
details. In particular, we introduce for each report a time window to model certain periods when a periodic
report can be created. We also elaborate on the event ModifyReport to model the possible changes of a
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Machine RMS ref1
Sees RMS c1
Variables reports,report state,permissions, ...
Invariants . . .
∀rp·rp ∈ REPORT S ∧ report state(rp) = VOID ⇒ (permissions(Reporter 7→ rp) = {C} ∧
permissions(Controller 7→ rp) =∅∧ permissions(Administrator 7→ rp) =∅)
∀rp·rp ∈ reports ∧ report state(rp) = CREATED ⇒ (permissions(Reporter 7→ rp) = {R,W,D} ∧
permissions(Controller 7→ rp) =∅∧ permissions(Administrator 7→ rp) =∅)
∀rp·rp ∈ reports ∧ report state(rp) = SUBMITTED ⇒ (permissions(Reporter 7→ rp) = {R} ∧
permissions(Controller 7→ rp) = {R,W}∧ permissions(Administrator 7→ rp) =∅)
∀rp·rp ∈ reports ∧ report state(rp) = APPROVED ⇒ (permissions(Reporter 7→ rp) = {R} ∧
permissions(Controller 7→ rp) = {R}∧ permissions(Administrator 7→ rp) = {R,W})
. . .
Events...
CreateReport refines CreateReport =̂
any rp
where ...
C ∈ permissions(Reporter,rp)
then
reports := reports∪ {rp}
report state(rp) := CREATED
permissions(Reporter,rp) := {R,W,D}
end
SubmitReport refines SubmitReport =̂
any rp
where ...
R ∈ permissions(Reporter,rp)
then
report state(rp) := SUBMITTED
permissions := (permissionsC− ({Reporter 7→ rp 7→ {R}} ∪ {Controller 7→ rp 7→ {R,W}}))
end
...
end
Figure 6: The machine RMS ref1
report before its submission. In particular, we define the notion of report timestamps to keep track on
time.
Next, we populate our model with the users and introduce a number of inter-relationships between
the system users and their roles as well as relationships between the users. For instance, a reporter sends
a report for approval to her/his associated controller while the controller sends the approved report to the
associated administrator.
As a result of the described refinement chain, we arrive at a final model of RMS. We specify and
verify dynamic access control via allowed rights on data according to the system policies.
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Summary. A development of RMS discussed above follows the certain strategy. The proposed ap-
proach can be summarised as follows:
1. Define main roles and their functions associated with the system. Represent actors as roles, func-
tions as use cases and create a use case model of the system.
2. Create an activity diagram representing the intended workflow.
3. For each use case define the basic access rights required to execute this particular function.
4. Create a state diagram representing how execution of each function changes the state of the data.
5. Using the created state diagram, create an abstract specification in Event-B that defines the state
of data and the corresponding state transitions.
6. Using the use case diagram, refine the abstract specification to define roles and the corresponding
access rights.
7. Using the activity diagram, refine the specification to represent the workflow and time-dependant
properties of dynamic state-based RBAC.
5 Conclusions
Related Work. Significant amount of work has been done on integrating graphical and formal specifi-
cation techniques to support system development (see e.g., [5, 11, 13, 27]). In particular, the combination
UML with Petri Nets is discussed in [5]. The paper shows a method for translating UML sequence di-
agrams to Petri nets and verifying deadlock freeness, reachability, safety and liveness properties. The
work [11] presents a framework for integration UML with Object-Z. Various kinds of UML diagrams are
used to specify the system from different concerns during the requirements elicitation and analysis stage.
Then the captured information is used to develop a complete Object-Z specification. In our work, we
follow the same idea and consult the graphical models while creating Event-B specifications. In [26, 27]
UML-B – a graphical formal modelling notation – has been proposed to support class diagrams and state
machines concepts within the Event-B development. However, the goal of our research is to consider
possible combination UML and Event-B modelling in the context of access control model and RBAC
policies.
The topic of combining graphical domain-specific notation with formal Event-B models has also
been explored in a number of works focusing on modelling dependable systems [18, 19, 23, 24, 29, 30].
The overall goal pursued in these work were to facilitate construction of a formal model by relying on a
suitable graphical notation.
The importance of RBAC visualization has been recognized by Jaeger and Tidswell [10]. A body of
research done on applying UML to describe and analyse RBAC policies [9, 21, 28]. A number of works
uses UML and OCL based domain specific language to design and validate the access control model.
For instance, in the work [9] the authors applied UML and OCL to discover and eliminate undesired
policy properties, which do not meet the security requirements. In [28] UML is also used to describe
security properties. In contrast to our work, here the authors transform UML models to Alloy for analysis
purpose.
There is a number of works that address the policy analysis and verification issues related to RBAC
model. For instance, the problem of inconsistent access control specifications is studied in [25]. To verify
the correctness of event-driven RBAC policies a Petri-Net based framework has been applied. Similar
to our work, Event-B has been applied to model and analyse access control policies [3, 8]. Akeel et al.
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[3] have studied the problem of data leakage threats in the access control model. They used Event-B
and associated refinement approach to formalise the requirements over the specific policy elements that
satisfy Confidentiality, Privacy and Trust properties. In our work we use Event-B to formulate and prove
the dynamic data integrity properties. The challenge of integrating RBAC into systems modelling and
verification has been addressed also by Benaı¨ssa et al. in [4]. They start from a security policy description
given in a Prolog-like formalism (OrBAC), and refine the description into an Event-B model capturing
the system-specific activities to be verified under the policy.
The basic RBAC model has been extended in a variety of ways [1, 7, 20]. For instance, the problem
of spatio-temporal RBAC model is discussed in [1]. The authors considered role-based access control
policies under time and location constraints. Moreover, they demonstrated how the proposed model
can be represented and analysed using UML and OCL. Ray et al. [20] proposed location-aware RBAC
model that incorporates location constraints in user-role activation. In our work we consider dynamic,
state-dependent constraints within the access control model. In [12] the interactions between agents have
been studied using goal-oriented perspective. In this work, the roles were defined as agent capabilities to
perform certain tasks.
In our previous work [14] to facilitate development in Event-B we relied on the Event Refinement
Structure approach (ERS). This approach augments Event-B refinement with a graphical notation that
allows the designers to explicitly represent the relationships between the events at different abstraction
levels as well as define the required event sequences in a model. In current work we used graphical
models as a middle hand to construct Event-B specifications.
Verification of data integrity and data consistency properties in Event-B framework has also been
investigated in [15] in the context of cloud data base. Moreover, in [16, 17] we verified by proofs
correctness and safety of consistent updates of patient data records. However, the current work is mainly
focused on possible combination UML and Event-B to specify and verify dynamic access control.
Discussion. In this paper, we have discussed a problem of an integrated modelling of dynamic ac-
cess rights. Our approach aimed at combining graphical modelling and formal specification in Event-
B. The used graphical models to define in a structured way the roles associated with the system, use
cases and workflow. The graphical models were used as a middle hand to construct formal models in
Event-B.
Formal modelling in Event-B allowed us to rigorously define and verify the dynamic access rights
and formulate and prove the dynamic data integrity properties. In this paper, we merely consulted the
graphical models to create the corresponding specifications. Currently, we are working on defining
graphical and formal specification patterns for representing the dynamic access rights. Such patterns
would allow us to automatically translate graphical models into the corresponding formal models and
consequently enable the formal verification of dynamic data integrity properties.
Moreover, as a part of our future work, we are also planing to further extend the current work and
consider a more complex setting of access model. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate the
situation when the users can get simultaneous or partial access to some parts of a data entity depending
on their roles and resource states.
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